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Article 7

EVADING LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION
Austen L. Parrish*
In the last few years, and mostly unnoticed, courts have adopted a different
approach to issues of legislative jurisdiction. Instead of grappling with the difficult
question of whether Congress intended a law to reach beyond U.S. borders, some courts
have side-stepped it entirely. Courts have done so by redefining extraterritoriality. Significant and contentious decisions in the Ninth and D. C. Circuits paved the way by
holding that not all regulation of overseasforeign conduct is extraterritorial.And then
suddenly, in 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court may have unintentionally breathed life
into the practice. In its landmark Morrison v. National Australia Bank decision,
the Court suggested that legislationfocused on domestic conditions may not be extraterritorial, even if the legislation regulates overseasforeign activity.
This Essay laments the birth of this troubling new approach, where established
law is jettisoned and legislative jurisdiction analysis is evaded. The Essay's aim is
largely descriptive: it summarizes an important development and reveals how courts
have lapsed into error. But it goes beyond the descriptive to also critique the new practice. Redefining extraterritorialitynot only subverts established doctrine, it removes an
important safeguard to the difficulties that extraterritorialregulation creates. More
problematically, the practice undercuts principles that have been foundational in both
domestic and internationallaw.
INTRODUCTION

At one time, the fundamentals of the law of legislative jurisdiction
were mostly settled. As a general matter, the law shielded each state
from the intrusion of others, ensuring that each could pursue its own
economic and social objectives. Extraterritorial regulation-the regu@ 2012 Austen L. Parrish. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law and Vice Dean, Southwestern Law School. The author is
grateful to Maria Daatio for her research assistance. The Essay benefited from
discussions with or feedback from Lea Brilmayer, Hannah Buxbaum, Anthony
Colangelo, Bill Dodge, Paul Dubinsky, Max Huffman, John Knox, Daniel Margolies,
Jeffrey Meyer, Trevor Morrison, Kal Raustiala, and Christopher Whytock. Portions of
this Essay were presented at the 2011 AALS Annual Meeting, a symposium held at
Southwestern Law School, and at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Society
of International Law.
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lation of foreign conduct outside the United States-although tolerated under certain circumstances, was disfavored and in tension with
basic international law principles. To be sure, significant and vigorous
debate existed at the margins over the extent to which constitutional
provisions constrained congressional action and over how courts
should interpret a statute's geographic reach in the face of congressional silence. But while those debates played out at the periphery,
the core doctrine remained untouched.' Even when globalization
rendered territorial limits to law less important as a descriptive matter,
the heart of the doctrinal analysis remained intact. Absent contrary
evidence, Congress was presumed to have exercised only its territorial
jurisdiction.
What once was set, however, has softened. In the last few years,
and largely unnoticed, courts have taken a different tack. Instead of
wrestling with the difficult questions of whether Congress intended a
law to apply to foreign conduct and, if so, whether doing so is constitutional or consistent with international law, some courts have sidestepped the issue of legislative jurisdiction entirely. They have done
so by redefining extraterritoriality itself. Significant decisions in the
Ninth and the D.C. Circuits paved the way by holding that not all regulation of overseas foreign conduct is extraterritorial.2 And then in
2010, perhaps unintentionally, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to
breathe life into the practice. The Court suggested that legislation
"focus[ed]" on domestic conditions is not extraterritorial, even if the
legislation regulates foreign activity.3
This Essay laments the birth of this troubling new approach.
Unlike a number of recent articles that have sought to develop com1 This description of legislative jurisdiction calls to mind Ernest Gellner's assessment of a Kokoschka painting: discerning a clear pattern in the details is difficult,
even though the picture as a whole can be easily recognized. Cf ERNEST GELLNER,
NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 139 (1983) (famously comparing the pre-modern, prenationalism map to a Kokoschka painting: a "riot of colours," with no clear pattern in
the detail, though with a clear overall pattern of diversity, plurality, and complexity).
2 See United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009);
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).
3 See Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884-85 (2010); see
also Zachary D. Clopton, Bowman Lives: The ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Criminal
Law After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 137,
138-39 (2011) (describing how Morrisonpermits "a new approach" that would permit
extraterritorial application of criminal law without considering the presumption
against extraterritoriality); William S. Dodge, Morrison 's Effects Test, 40 S.w. U. L. REV.
687 (2011) (arguing that Morrison changes the presumption against extraterritoriality
so that the presumption does not apply when effects of conduct are felt in the United
States).
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prehensive frameworks for addressing extraterritorial regulation 4 or
to refashion this area of law,5 the Essay's goal is more modest. It seeks
to limn an important development and reveal how courts have lapsed
into error. In so doing, it also aims to clear away some of the confusion that has festered in the lower courts. Part I summarizes the law of
legislative jurisdiction and the doctrinal principles that courts use to
determine whether Congress intended to regulate conduct occurring
outside U.S. borders. Part II then describes how courts have circumvented doctrine through redefining extraterritoriality. Part II ends
with a critique of this new practice and explains why redefining extraterritoriality obscures an already difficult analysis. Finally, in Part III,
the Essay suggests that a return to well-established law would correct
some of the excesses of transnational litigation. It explains why redefining extraterritoriality to evade legislative jurisdiction analysis not
only subverts the territorial principle, but removes an important safeguard to the problems that extraterritorial regulation engenders.
More problematically, the redefinition marks a sharp departure from
foundational principles that have defined the international legal system. It is a departure that, if embraced, threatens to increase global
conflict, frustrate multilateralism, and undermine American interests.
A point to stress before proceeding: the doctrinal sleight of hand
where courts avoid the thorny issues surrounding legislative jurisdiction is not merely of academic concern. The extension of federal law
to activity outside the United States has dramatically increased in the
last decade and promises to continue.6 The way courts approach leg4 For a few recent examples, see Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to
Extraterritoriality,97 VA. L. REV. 1019 (2011); John H. Knox, A Presumption Against
Extrajurisdictionality,104 AM. J. INT'L L. 351, 351-52, 396 (2010); Jeffrey A. Meyer,
Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S.
Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 164-79 (2010).
5 See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, The GlobalizationofJurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
311, 490-511 (2002) (attacking territorial theories of jurisdiction and proposing a
"cosmopolitan pluralist" theory); William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of
Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism,39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101, 141, 154
(1998) (arguing for a new approach favoring the application of U.S. law whenever
conduct abroad causes substantial and foreseeable effects that the U.S. law was
intended to prevent); Ralf Michaels, Territorial Jurisdiction After Territoriality, in
GLOBALISATION AND JURISDICTION 105 (Piet Jan Slot & Mielle Bulterman eds., 2004)
(describing globalization's challenges to territoriality and describing a variety of possible responses in conceptualizing jurisdiction).
6 See generally GARY B. BoRN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS (5th ed. 2011) (analyzing the different elements of
international civil law cases in U.S. courts); VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANsIUs, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DisPuTEs IN U.S. COURTS (2d ed. 2008) (establishing, in a
multi-volume treatise, the current landscape of transnational litigation for practition-
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islative jurisdiction determines, in part, how quickly these sorts of
transnational cases will multiply. Indicative of the trend, legislative
jurisdiction cases have become a common fixture on the Supreme
Court's docket.7 Not surprisingly, as the world flattens, and people
and markets become more interconnected 8 courts are pressed to provide a forum for malfeasance wherever it occurs. 9 Legislative jurisdiction analysis, however, has a broader significance. It is the doctrinal
plane upon which ongoing and significant debates are waged: the
importance of national courts in global governance,10 the role that
territoriality should play in law," as well as the extent to which domesers). See also Report of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug.
11, 2006, Annex E, at 516, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006), available at http://untreaty.un.
org/ilc/reports/2006/2006report.htm (describing and providing examples of how
U.S. domestic laws that regulate foreign conduct are becoming "increasingly common"); Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming InternationalLaw from Extraterritoriality,93 MINN.
L. REV. 815, 846-48 (2009) (listing contexts in which U.S. laws have been applied
extraterritorially, from antitrust, to copyright, to securities regulation, to trademark,
to corporate law and governance, to bankruptcy and tax, to criminal, environmental,
civil rights, and labor laws).
7 For some prominent recent examples, see Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869; Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010); Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Microsoft v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); Small v.
United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005); Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S.
119 (2005); Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466 (2004); F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
8 See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT (2007) (describing how
globalization and technological change has led to an interconnected world).
9 See INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 5 (2009) (hereinafter IBA REPORT), available at ibanet.org
("[B]usinesses and individuals are increasingly acting, and producing effects, across
state boundaries. In doing so, they enliven the desire of states to assert their laws
extraterritorially.").
10 See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of InternationalLaw, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 59 (2009) (describing
how national courts are beginning to more aggressively engage in the interpretation
and application of international law); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of
Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191, 217-18 (2003) (describing a world of transnational
judicial relations); Melissa A. Waters, Normativity in the "New" Schools: Assessing the Legitimacy of International Legal Norms Created by Domestic Courts, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 455,
459-62 (2007) (describing the role of domestic courts in creating international
norms); Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 67, 96-115 (2009) (systematically analyzing the global impact of domestic
courts). For a well-known early exploration of the role of national courts, see RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
(1964).
11 See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? (2009)
(analyzing how fundamental changes in American politics have altered the territorial
system of American law); TERRITORIALITY AND CONFLCTr IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
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tic law, as contrasted with international law, should address transnational challenges. 12 For these reasons, it serves as a cornerstone for a
distinct field of law.' 3
I.

WELL-ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE?

Legislative jurisdiction refers to Congress's authority to prescribe
or regulate conduct.1 4 Congress's power to apply its law to occur(Miles Kahler & Barbara F. Walter eds., 2006) (discussing the various cause-and-effect
relationships among territoriality, conflict, and globalization); see also John Gerard
Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in InternationalRelations, 47
INT'L ORG. 139, 174 (1993) (famously noting how little the concept of territoriality
has been studied); cf LEGAL BORDERLANDS (Mary L. Dudziak and Leti Volpp, eds.,
2006) (examining the role of law in the construction of U.S. borders and the impact
that globalization has had on American studies scholarship). A significant debate also
plays out in the context of the U.S. Constitution's extraterritorial reach. See generally
Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution?ExtraterritorialityAfter Boumediene,
109 COLUm. L. REV. 973, 973 (2009) (noting how "[q]uestions concerning the extraterritorial applicability of the Constitution have come to the fore" in recent years in
the context of the war on terror).
12 For an overview of these debates, see Parrish, supra note 6. See also Sarah H.
Cleveland, Embedded InternationalLaw and the Constitution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
225, 244-47 (2010) (describing the role of international law in the context of extraterritorial constitutional application); Tonya L. Putnam, Courts Without Borders: Domestic Sources of U.S. Extraterritoriality in the Regulatory Sphere, 63 INT'L ORG. 459 (2009)
(describing the role of domestic courts in transnational regulation); Anne-Marie
Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of InternationalLaw is Domestic (or, The
European Way of Law), 47 HARv. INT'L L.J. 327, 350 (2006) (arguing that international
law must harness the power of national institutions to achieve global objectives).
13 See PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAw (1956) (reprinting the author's
Storrs Lectures, delivered at Yale Law School in February 1956) (coining the term
"transnational law" and arguing that the world needed a field of law in this area). For
recent discussion, see generally Paul R. Dubinsky, Is TransnationalLitigation a Distinct
Field? The Persistence of Exceptionalism in American ProceduralLaw, 44 STAN. J. INT'L L.
301 (2008) (describing transnationalism); Linda Silberman, TransnationalLitigation:
Is There a "Field"?A Tribute to Hal Maier,39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1427 (2006) (argu-

ing that transnational litigation is a field meriting autonomous treatment). Increasingly, law schools have focused on integrating transnational law into their curriculum.
See Anita Bernstein, On Nourishingthe Curriculum with a TransnationalLaw Lagniappe,
56 J. LEGAL EDuc. 578, 578-79 (2006) (describing integration of transnational law
into the curriculum and noting the Association of American Law Schools' announcement that "it is important for first-year law students to gain experience in transnational law" (quoting American Association of Law Schools, 2006 Annual Meeting

Program Brochure, "What is Transnational Law and Why Does it Matter?")); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why TransnationalLaw Matters, 24 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REv. 745, 751-52
(2006) (describing how and why law schools include transnational law in the first-year
curriculum).
14 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 401
(1987); see also Willis L.M. Reese, LegislativeJurisdiction,78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1587
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rences in the United States, within constitutional limits, is uncontested.1 5 Legislative jurisdiction comes into play when a state attempts
to apply its law to the foreign acts of non-nationals. When the United
States attempts to formally project its laws outside U.S. borders, issues
of extraterritoriality come to the fore. While some of these issues are
the subject of spirited debate, many of the precepts are settled.
A.

ExtraterritorialityDefined

One of the long-settled precepts is the definition of "extraterritoriality." Both courts and commentators refer to extraterritorial legislation the same way: domestic law that regulates conduct abroad.1 6 For
the U.S. Supreme Court, territorial jurisdiction involves "places over
which the United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative control."' 7 In a similar vein, Black's Law Dictionary defines
"jurisdiction" as "[a] government's general power to exercise authority over all persons and things within its territory," while it defines
"extraterritorial jurisdiction" as "a court's ability to exercise power
(1978) (defining legislative jurisdiction as "the power of the state to apply its law to
create or affect legal interests"). Legislative jurisdiction is often distinguished from
adjudicative or judicial jurisdiction, which is the court's power to subject particular
persons or things to the judicial process. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 401 (b)-(c).
15 See IBA REPORT, supranote 9, at 11 ("The starting point for jurisdiction is that
all states have competence over events occurring and persons . . . present in their
territory. This principle, known as the 'principle of territoriality,' is the most common and least controversial basis for jurisdiction."); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 297 (6th ed. 2003) (describing territorial jurisdiction
as non-controversial).
16 See Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, FederalExtraterritorialityand Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1217, 1218 n.3 (1992) (explaining that a case
"involves extraterritoriality when at least one relevant event occurs in another
nation"); Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality,and the Resolution offurisdictional
Conflict, 57 AM. J. Comp. L. 631, 636 (2009) ("Historically, in its strictest sense, the
concept [of territorial jurisdiction] referred to the exclusive authority of a state to
regulate events occurring within its borders."); Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritorialityand
Multiterritorialityin Copyright Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 588 (1997) (defining
extraterritoriality as "the application of one country's laws to events occurring outside
that country's borders"); Meyer, supra note 4, at 123 (explaining that "a law is extraterritorial if it governs acts that occur outside the nation-state's borders, even if committed by the nation's own citizens").
17 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. ("Aramco"), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); see also
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371 (2005) (explaining that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply when conduct occurs in the United
States); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("By definition, an extraterritorial application of a statute involves the regulation of conduct
beyond U.S. borders.").
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beyond its territorial limits." 18 This is not to say that extraterritorial
regulation is forbidden or necessarily even of dubious legality. On the
contrary, international law permits states to regulate overseas conduct
in a number of contexts, such as regulating the conduct of its own
citizens.19 But when Congress uses a basis of jurisdiction other than
territorial jurisdiction, Congress has regulated extraterritorially.
This understanding-that extraterritoriality is implicated whenever a state exercises jurisdiction on a basis other than territorial jurisdiction-is consistent with the doctrine's historical underpinnings.
Limiting a state's regulatory authority to activities within its borders
was at one time beyond dispute. In the personal jurisdiction, choice
of law, and international law contexts, rules had territorial limits. 20 As
Justice Story famously declared, "every nation possesses an exclusive
sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory," and "it would be
wholly incompatible with equality and exclusiveness of the sovereignty
of all nations, that any one nation should be at liberty to regulate
either persons or things not within its own territory." 2 1 Beale summarized the universally agreed upon rule the same way: "Since the power
of a state is supreme within its own territory, no other state can exercise power there .

. .

. It follows generally that no statute has force to

affect any person, thing, or act, outside the territory of the state that
passed it."22 These understandings were widely held. 23 And even
when strict territorial approaches eventually gave way in other areas of
18 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 929 (9th ed. 2009).
19 Under international law, states may regulate foreign conduct under generally
five bases ofjurisdiction: territoriality, nationality, protective principle, passive personality, and universality. See A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 183-212 (11th
ed. 1994). More controversial is whether international law permits extraterritorial
regulation under the effects test. See Austen L. Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality's Fith Business, 61 VAND. L. REv. 1455 (2008); see also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note
6, at 599-601, 680 (describing the "nationality doctrine").
20 See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909)
("[T] he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.")
(legislative jurisdiction); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) ("The authority of
every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is
established.") (adjudicatoryjurisdiction); The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824) ("The
laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards
its own citizens.") (legislative jurisdiction); Schooner Exch. v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) ("The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute.").
21 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAws 19, 21 (Hilliard, Gray
& Co., 1834).
22 1 JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWs 311-12 (1935); see also
Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 356 (explaining that statutes must be construed "to be
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the law, 2 4 states were still cautious about extending law beyond the
water's edge. Congress would be presumed to usually regulate only
activity in U.S. territory or under American control.
A limited exception to the notion that foreign conduct was
beyond a state's territorial jurisdiction was known as the "objective"
application of the territorial principle. In situations where a crime's
effects were so much part of the act that produced them "that their
separation [would render] the offense non-existent," courts found territorial jurisdiction implicated even though the conduct that commenced the crime occurred abroad. 2 5 Simply that a crime's effects
were felt within a state, however, was insufficient. Rather, jurisdiction
existed only when the crime's nature meant that the crime was consummated in the place where the direct effect of the criminal act took
place (i.e., when those effects were a constituent element of the
crime).2 6 Hence, when a person fired a gun across a border and
confined in ... operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker
has general and legitimate power").
23 See S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. V. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (sr. A) No. 10, at 45 (Judgment of
Sept. 7) ("The first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a
State is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it may not
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial . . . ."); id. at 204 (Lord Finlay) ("A country is no more

entitled to assume jurisdiction over foreigners than it would be to annex a bit of
territory which happened to be very convenient for it."); see also 2 JOHN BASSETT
MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 236 (1906) ("There is no principle better
settled than that the penal laws of a country have no extraterritorial force."); Research
in International Law, Harvard Law School, jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J.
INT'L L. SupP. 435, 480-84 (1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research] (describing territorial jurisdiction and settled tenets).
24 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318-20 (1950)
(replacing territorial-based notice rules with rules focused on fairness); Int'l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (moving away from a territorial theory ofjurisdiction in the personal jurisdiction context). In the conflicts-of-law context, various theories were advanced to replace territorial rules. See, e.g., DAVID F. CAVERS, THE
CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCEss (1965) (attempting to create a "rational analytical framework" for conflict-of-law controversies); BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICr OF LAws (1963) (analyzing the various issues of conflicts-of-laws); ALBERT A.
EHRENZWEIc, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1962) (analyzing the history and
policy backgrounds in conflicts-of-law cases).

For a description of this move away

from territorial theories, see Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts of
Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARv. L. REV. 377, 379 (1966) (describing how legal
realists attacked territorial approaches to conflicts of law).
25 S.S. "Lotus, " 1927 P.C.I.J., at 86.
26 See id. (noting that the effect must constitute a constituent element of the
crime); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 18(b)
(1965) (explaining the effect must constitute a constituent element of the crime);
HarvardResearch, supra note 23, at 480, 494-95 (explaining for the objective applica-
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killed another in a neighboring state, the crime was said to have
occurred within the neighboring state.2 7 As a leading American
authority once put it: "The principle that a man who outside of a
country willfully puts in motion a force to take effect in it is answerable at the place where the evil was done, is recognized in the criminal
jurisprudence of all countries." 28
But this exception-or, perhaps, qualification-to the common
concept of territorial jurisdiction was narrow. It was generally limited
to the criminal context; the effects had to be substantial and direct, if
not immediate; and the effects also had to form a part of the actus
reus, so that the crime would be considered completed in the territory
claiming jurisdiction. 29 Only a few crimes met these requirements. 3 0
And even if the requirements were met, the crime had to be an
offense "which the community of civilized nations ha[d] come to
regard as justifying a modification of the strict territorial principle."3 1
tion of the territoriality principle, the effect must be indistinguishable from the act, as
an "essential constituent element" or "part" of the crime); see also R.Y. Jennings, Extraterritorialjurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146,
159-60 (1957) (describing the objective territorial principle); cf Strassheim v. Daily,
221 U.S. 280 (1911) (articulating an effects test).
27 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAw OF THE U.S. § 18,
Illus. 2; see also Simpson v. State, 17 S.E. 984, 985 (Ga. 1893) ("[I]f a man in the State
of South Carolina criminally fires a ball into the State of Georgia, the law regards him
as accompanying the ball, and as being represented by it, up to the point where it
strikes.").

28 SeeJennings, supra note 26, at 157 (quoting 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEsT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 244 (1906)).
29 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 18(b); see
also Jennings, supra note 26, at 160 (analyzing limiting factors in an effects test for
extraterritorial jurisdiction); HarvardResearch, supra note 23, at 487-94 (arguing that
a state should have jurisdiction if any part of the crime is committed within those
borders).

30 The United States had "rarely sought to prosecute for crimes committed
Law, 13
outside its territorial jurisdiction." Note, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction-Criminal
HARv. INT'L L.J. 346, 347 (1972); see also Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antitrust
Law: A Conflict ofLaw Approach, 70 YALE L.J. 259, 266--68 (1960) (describing the prohibition against extraterritorial enforcement of penal laws). In 1970, the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws reported that "the issue of the
extraterritorial application of the federal criminal law is one which does not arise
frequently." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, FINAL

REPORT 21 (1971). And when legislation was proposed to obviate the need for courts
to ascertain the extraterritorial implications of federal criminal law legislation, jurisdiction over activity having substantial effects in the United States was notably absent.

Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975, S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1975).
31 George Winthrop Haight, InternationalLaw and ExtraterritorialApplication of the
Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639, 643-44 (1954).
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The objective territorial principle was in many ways then simply a
restatement of the understanding that "a crime is committed wherever an essential element of the crime is accomplished."3 2 Of course,
it had to be this way. If all acts-criminal or otherwise-invoked territorial jurisdiction wherever effects were felt, "[it] would permit a practically unlimited extension of [the objective territorial] principle to
cover almost any conceivable situation."33 This once obvious observation was near definitional, for "[i]t would be absurd, indeed, if an
almost unlimited extraterritorial jurisdiction could be ostensibly based
4
upon a territorial principle of jurisdiction." 3
Admittedly, Congress does not always legislate using its territorial
jurisdiction. From time to time, Congress regulates foreign conduct
exercising a different basis of jurisdiction. But when Congress has
done so, it has always considered the regulation extraterritorial. Even
when some courts controversially began applying an expansive effects
approach, to allow jurisdiction over conduct having substantial effects
within the United States,3 5 courts and policymakers nevertheless
described the regulation as extraterritorial. The well-studied antitrust
context underscores the point. While the U.S. antitrust laws have prescribed certain foreign activity since the 1940s, those laws have always
been treated as extraterritorial regulation.3 6 Many have criticized the
32 HarvardResearch, supra note 23, at 494; see also David J. Gerber, Beyond Balancing: InternationalLaw Restraints on the Reach of National Laws, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 185,
195-98 (1984) (explaining that objective territoriality applies where the criminal act
was consummated, i.e., where the consequences of the act were localized).
33 Jennings, supra note 26, at 160.
34 Id.; see also Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorialjurisdiction, in INrERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 106-08 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3d ed. 2008) (describing how
the object territorial theory was expanded liberally and impermissibly in some contexts); G.W. Haight, Antitrust Laws and the TerritorialPrinciple, 11 VAND. L. REV. 27, 35
(1957) (noting that S.S. Lotus did not intend an "obliteration of territoriality" and
quoting Justice Story that "[t]he absurd results of such a state of things need not be
dwelt upon"). For a detailed recent description of the objective territoriality principle
and its subsequent development into a more expansive effects doctrine in the United
States and Germany, see Buxbaum, supra note 16, at 638-42.
35 See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952) (applying trademark
law to foreign activity with U.S. effects); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (describing jurisdiction based on effects); see also Buxbaum, supra note 16, at 639 (describing how the objective territoriality principle was
dramatically expanded with an effects approach); Gerber, supra note 32, at 195-96
(distinguishing objective territoriality from an effects approach). For a description of
the effects test, its development, and its problems, see Parrish, supra note 19.
36 For some prominent examples, see Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritorialityin U.S.
and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 AnITRUST L.J. 159 (1999); Haight, supra note 31;
John Byron Sandage, Forum Non Conveniens and the ExtraterritorialApplication of the
United States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J. 1693 (1985); Russell J. Weintraub, The Extrater-
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antitrust laws for aggressively reaching out beyond U.S. borders, while
others find the regulation essential. But neither courts, scholars, nor
practitioners take the position that the antitrust laws are just business
as usual: a plain, vanilla exercise of territorial jurisdiction.3
B. Determining the Reach of Domestic Laws
While the definition of extraterritoriality is generally well-understood, in broad-brush, so too is the doctrinal analysis. Traditionally,
courts approach assertions of extraterritorial regulation with a twopronged inquiry. First, does Congress have the power to enact the
law? Second, did Congress exercise that power? On occasion, courts
have infused a third, judicial-restraint assessment into the analysis.
The first prong, although well-accepted, is often overlooked or
simply assumed to be met. The U.S. Constitution and international
law impose limits on Congress's ability to regulate foreign conduct.
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause38 and other constitutional provisions3 9 provide some limitation on Congress's ability to
regulate conduct with little connection to the United States. 40 Under
ritorialApplication of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice-ofLaw" Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799 (1992); see also Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of
the Antitrust Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 70 YALE L.J. 259 (1960) (discussing the
importance of extraterritorial applications of antitrust law).
37 That extraterritoriality is implicated when a domestic law seeks to regulate the
conduct of foreigners abroad is consistent with how that term is used in determining
the reach of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Constitution has been held to constrain
government action within the United States' territory or control. While the Constitution may or may not follow the flag, constitutional rights and protections are generally
not afforded to foreigners on foreign soil. See Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?,
100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991).
38 See Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, FederalExtraterritorialityand Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1217 (1992). But see A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process
Limits on Federal ExtraterritorialLegislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379 (1997)
(arguing against due process limits to extraterritorial regulation). For a discussion of
due process limitations domestically, see Reese, supra note 14, at 1589.
39 See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949,
951-58 (2010) (describing limits imposed by the foreign commerce clause). For a
discussion of limits in the criminal law context, see Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the
Article I Horizon, Congress's Enumerated Powers and Universaljurisdictionover Drug Crimes,
93 MINN. L. REV. 1191, 1219-23 (2009); Eugene Kontorovich, The "Define and Punish"
Clause and the Limits of UniversalJurisdiction,103 Nw. U. L. REV. 149 (2009).
40 Professor Lea Brilmayer is probably the best known for championing the position, in the adjudicatory and legislative jurisdiction contexts, that some relationship
between the defendant and the United States must exist for a state's exercise of
authority to be politically legitimate. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due
Process Limitations on State Courtjurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 77, 86-87 (1980); Lea
Brilmayer, jurisdictionalDue Process and Political Theory, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 293, 294
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international law, a state only has the power to regulate within one of
the traditional categories of jurisdiction.41 Because of these constitutional and international law limitations, courts avoid reading statutes
in a way that would raise significant constitutional concerns 4 2 or in a
way that would violate international law.4 3
When Congress has authority to regulate foreign conduct, courts
must still assess whether Congress intended to exercise that authority.
This is the second prong of the analysis. In the face of legislative
silence or ambiguity, courts generally presume that Congress does not
intend to regulate extraterritorial conduct.4 4 The nature and amount
(1987); Lea Brilmayer, Shaping and Sharing in Democratic Theory: Towards a Political
Philosophy of Interstate Equality, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 389, 391 (1987); Brilmayer &
Norchi, supra note 38.
41 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 299-307 (7th ed.
2008) (setting out the bases of jurisdiction under international law).
42 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fl. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute
would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to
avoid such problems unless such a construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress."). For recent analysis and overviews of the doctrine, see Richard L. Hasen,
ConstitutionalAvoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 Sup. CT. REV. 181
(2009); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006). For the classic critique of canons of construction, see
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
43 "[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations
if any other possible construction remains." Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 115 cmt. a (1987) (noting that "[i]t is generally
assumed that Congress does not intend to repudiate an international obligation").
The "practice of using international law to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes"
is not a new approach, but "firmly established in [the U.S. Supreme Court's] jurisprudence." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164
(2004) (courts "must assume" that "Congress ordinarily seeks to follow ... principles
of customary international law"); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (quoting Murray, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118 ("[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.")). See
generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation ofPowers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of InternationalLaw, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998) (analyzing Charming Betsy doctrine and changes in international law since the outcome of that case);
Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of InternationalLaw As a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990) (discussing international law generally and
within the context of the Charming Betsy case).
44 See Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (reaffirming
the presumption against extraterritoriality); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S.

437, 545 (2007) (affirming the presumption and noting that "foreign conduct is [generally] the domain of foreign law"); Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388-89
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of evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption admittedly is
hazy,4 5 but the need to ascertain congressional intent is always the
starting point for the analysis.4 6 This two-step approach is consistent
with how courts assess Congress's use ofjurisdiction in other contexts.
Courts commonly conclude that Congress has not exercised its full
power and interpret statutes to fall well within constitutional or international law limits. 4 7
Even if Congress authorized extraterritorial regulation, at times
courts exercise discretion and for prudential reasons decline to hear a
case. 4 8 Although the basis for such abstention is not entirely clear,
generally this sort of abstention falls under the umbrella of "interna(2005) (affirming the presumption); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)) (affirming the presumption); see also CURTIS BRADLEY & JACK GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw 625
(2d ed. 2005) (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has applied a presumption against
extraterritoriality since early in the nation's history")
45 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869. A significant amount of scholarship has
recently debated the benefits and detriment of clear statement rules. See, e.g., John F.
Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 417-23
(2010) (providing an overview of the "wide-ranging debate" about clear statement
rules). Compare William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw:
ClearStatement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 612-29 (1992)
(criticizing clear statement rules), with Ernest A. Young, ConstitutionalAvoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1549, 1585-93
(2000) (defending clear statement rules).
46 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 813-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act . . . turn[s] on whether, in enacting the
Sherman Act, Congress asserted regulatory power over the challenged conduct."); cf
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 379 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("Congress ... has the sole authority to determine the extraterritorial reach of domestic laws."); Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248 ("It is our task to determine whether
Congress intended the protections of Title VII to apply to United States citizens
employed by American employers outside of the United States."), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006)).
47 See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1908)
(interpreting the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction to be narrower than
what is constitutionally permitted); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267
(1806) (Marshall, C.J.) (interpreting the statutory grant of diversityjurisdiction to be
narrower than constitutional limits).
48 See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583-92 (1953) (looking towards
principles of international law and adopting a multi-factor balancing approach); see
also Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir.
1979) (applying a balancing of interests approach); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1976) (limiting the effects test
through a rule of reason or interest balancing approach that accounts for international comity concerns).
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tional comity."49 Employing comity, courts consider a host of factors
to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable.5 0 Comity in the legislative jurisdiction area is thus used in a way
akin to its use in judicial abstention,5 1 forum non conveniens, 5 2 parallel proceedings, 53 and in other related contexts. 5 4 In general, courts
balance the interests of the United States in having the claim heard in
a U.S. court against the international comity ramifications of doing

49 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (defining international comity);
see also Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating InternationalComity as
Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 11 (2010) (discussing comity as a limit on
assertions of jurisdiction).
50 See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004)
(explaining that a court should "ordinarily construe . . . ambiguous statutes to avoid
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations"); see also
ANDREAS

F.

LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLE-

228 (1996) (describing the rule of reason/international comity approach); Max
Huffman, A Retrospective of Twenty-Five Years on the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act, 44 Hous. L. REv. 285, 298-300 (2007) (describing the factors courts consider in
comity analysis).
51 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-48 (1971) (Younger abstention); La.
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1959) (Thibodaux abstention); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333-34 (1943) (Burford abstention); R.R.
Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (Pullman abstention). See
generally RicHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1186-1212 (5th ed. 2003) (summarizing the various abstention
doctrines).
52 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 238 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1947). For an early overview of the doctrine, see Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient FederalForum, 60 HARv. L. REv. 908 (1947).
53 See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805-06
(1976); Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936); cf Turner Entm't Co. v.
Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1518-23 (11th Cir. 2004) (describing international
abstention). For a discussion of abstention in the context of parallel proceedings, see
Austen L. Parrish, Duplicative Foreign Litigation, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 237, 247-51
(2010) (describing different approaches to declining jurisdiction in the face of concurrent, duplicative foreign proceedings).
54 For the seminal article arguing that courts have discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction, see David L. Shapiro, jurisdiction and Discretion,60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543
(1985). For earlier discussions, see Hon. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982); Nathan Isaacs, The Limits offudicial Discretion,32 YALE
L.J. 339 (1923).
NESS
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so. 5 5 Invoking comity to decline jurisdiction, however, is controversial, in disfavor, and now infrequent.5 6
To say that the core principles surrounding the law of legislative
jurisdiction are settled does not mean that this area of law is free from
dispute. The law of legislative jurisdiction is notorious for being badly
fragmented and in disarray on the margins. Scholarly tussles are common and court decisions often reflect a degree of confusion.5 7 Significant disagreement exists, for example, over the application of
different canons of construction. The Supreme Court has not
resolved what exactly is required to overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality, nor do the justices agree on the role of clear statement rules in statutory interpretation.5 8

55 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 403
(1987); see also LOWENFELD, supra note 50, at 228 (describing the approach); Gary B.
Born, A Reappraisalof the ExtraterritorialReach of U.S. Law, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1,
86-90 (1992) (arguing for jurisdiction based on whether the U.S. has greatest connection to the disputes); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing of interests, and the
Exercise ofJurisdiction to Prescribe:Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 Am. J.
INT'L L. 42, 48-50 (1995) (describing interest-balancing approach).
56 See Hannah L. Buxhaum, The PrivateAttorney Generalin a GlobalAge: PublicInterests in Private InternationalAntitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219, 229-37 (2001)
(describing the rise and fall of interest balancing); see also Phillip R. Trimble, The
Supreme Court and InternationalLaw: The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 53, 57 (1995) (arguing that the international comity approach has lost any
influence); Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
563, 564-65 (2000) (explaining how the HartfordFire case "dealt comity a near death
blow" and that "comity as a legal doctrine in the courts has seen better days and will
rarely be successful").
57 See Colangelo, supra note 4, at 1021 (noting that "[a]cademic debate has raged
for decades" and the area is "badly fragmented and confused"); Knox, supra note 4, at
351-53 (describing inconsistency in the Court's jurisprudence leading to confusion);
Meyer, supra note 4, at 114-19 (describing scholarly debates and different
approaches-unilateral, territorial, and interest-balancing).
58 See Knox, supra note 4, at 351-53. From time to time, scholars have invited
courts to ignore the presumption against extraterritoriality and to dramatically
expand extraterritorial jurisdiction. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Understandingthe Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 90 (1998) (arguing that
the effects test should negate the presumption against extraterritoriality); Larry
Kramer, ExtraterritorialApplication of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A
Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 750, 752 (1995) (arguing for
application of U.S. law over foreign conduct that produces substantial effects within
the United States). While some lower courts have toyed with this idea, the Supreme
Court has consistently declined the invitation. See supra note 44.
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The History of American Extraterritoriality

Before continuing, a brief, albeit overly simplified, description of
the reasons behind the growth in extraterritorial regulation may be
helpful to appreciate the current pressure on courts to redefine extraterritoriality. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the United States
was in its nascent stages as a world power.5 9 While some important
exceptions existed, particularly when dealing with the southern border,60 the United States was nervous about broadly extending its law's
reach. This was understandable. Extraterritorial laws were viewed as
empire building and the province of great powers. Reciprocity was
also a concern. The United States did not want European powers
meddling in its internal affairs, and extraterritorial laws conjured
reminders of the "taxation without representation" that the early colonists railed against. 6 '
After the Second World War, however, the calculus changed.
Extraterritorial regulation in the commercial arena became an important weapon in the Cold War. It was a way for a dominant power in a
bipolar world to promote liberal capitalist democracy and free markets, while checking Soviet ambition. First with antitrust and then
with securities regulation, the United States sought to expand international influence through the unilateral application of domestic law.
Changes in other areas of the law also made the use of extraterritorial
regulation more acceptable. Territorial limits in choice-of-law, personal jurisdiction, and other areas had given way in the domestic context (albeit for different reasons), which provided a superficial
59 See RAUSTIALA, supra note 11, at 57 (explaining how, "[a]s a weak nation, with
an uncertain relationship to the great powers of the day, the early United States was
unsurprisingly drawn to the principle of complete sovereign control within demarcated geographic borders"); see also BARTHOLOMEW SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND
THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN

EMPIRE

(2006);

WALTER LAFEBER, THE

NEW EMPIRE

(1963).

60 See DANIEL S. MARGOLIES, SPACES OF LAW IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
140-75 (Univ. of Ga. Press, 2011) (describing U.S. border actions); see also Daniel S.
Margolies, The "Ill-Defined Fiction" of Extraterritorialityand Sovereign Exception in Late
Nineteenth Century U.S. ForeignRelations, 40 Sw. L. REV. 575 (2011) (discussing extraterritoriality in the Nineteenth Century).
61 See DANIEL A. SMITH, TAx CRUSADERS AND THE POLITICS OF DIREcr DEMOCRACY
21-23 (1998) (describing how Boston politician James Otis rephrased the English
"No Taxation Without Legislation" phrase that became the leading slogan of the
American revolution); Judge Grant Dorfman, The Founder's Legal Case: "No Taxation
Without Representation" Versus Taxation No Tyranny, 44 Hous. L. REV. 1377, 1377-81
(2008) (describing the history behind the phrase); James Otis, The Rights of the British
Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764), reprinted in 2 COLONIES TO NATION 28, 30 (Jack P.
Greene ed., 1967).
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justification for making territoriality less important when addressing
transboundary disputes. 62 Legal realism's influence on the courts in
the post-War period6 3 similarly made the bright-line rules and classic
legal thought that girded legislative jurisdiction analysis more suspect,
tempting courts to employ more flexible standards and balancing
tests. 6 4 And lastly, the development of the modem administrative
state after the New Deal meant that extraterritorial regulation was just
one component of other dramatic changes that promoted comprehensive regulation.6 5
A second wave of extraterritoriality was seen almost fifty years
later. At the Cold War's conclusion in the early 1990s, extraterritorial
regulation became important in a way different than it had been
before. Domestic regulation, applied to foreign conduct, became a
more palatable way to exert global influence than traditional empire
building. 66 While commercial laws-following in the steps of antitrust
and securities-had often been applied to regulate foreign conduct,
non-commercial laws had tended to be more constrained.6 7 For many
scholars, it was time to change that. From human rights, to environmental regulation, to labor and employment law, the projection of
American law was a way for U.S. interest groups to solidify domestic
62

See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 6, at 84-88, 724-88; see also infra note 64.
See MICHAEL KARAYANNI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN THE MODERN AGE 114-25
(2004) (describing the impact of legal realism on jurisdictional rules after the Second
World War).
64 See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317-24
(1950) (replacing territorial-based notice rules with rules focused on fairness); Int'l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (replacing territorial rules with rules
focused on fairness in the personal jurisdiction context). See generally George Rutherglen, International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 2001 Sup. CT. REV. 347, 347
(2001) (describing how the law of personal and legislative jurisdiction and the related
fields of venue and choice of law were "swept clear of nearly all rules, at least those
that [could] be applied in more of less determinate fashion").
65 See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of InternationalCooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Futureof InternationalLaw, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 12-13 (2002) (describing how "[i]n the New Deal and immediate postwar eras, domestic regulatory law
expanded markedly in the U.S. and across the globe"); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David
T. Zaring, Extraterritorialityin a Globalized World, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=39380 (connecting the growth of extraterritoriality with
the rise of the regulatory state).
66 See Nico Krisch, More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy,Equality and US Predominance
in InternationalLaw, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 135, 156 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003) (describing the U.S.

63

shift from international law to domestic law as a tool of foreign policy).

67 SeeJonathan Turley, "When in Rome": MultinationalMisconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598 (1990) (describing a different
treatment in market and non-market cases).

1690o

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87:4

power, while at the same time promoting American liberal values.6 8
Globalization, changes in communication and technology, and the
well-publicized unsavory practices of some multinational corporations
gave greater urgency to regulate malfeasance, wherever it occurred.
After 2001, the extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal law also
became an expeditious way to counter terrorism.69
Increased extraterritorial regulation was also consistent with intellectual trends as legal scholars from both the right and left of the
political spectrum withdrew from traditional, state-based, international law. 70 For neo-realist or sovereigntists scholars, extraterritorial
regulation was a way to exert foreign influence, while avoiding international obligations. For constructivists, pluralists, and liberal internationalists, extraterritorial regulation fit nicely with emerging theories
of transnational legal process, transnational networks, and the idea
that national courts are part of pluralistic cross-border dialogues. For
many, the growth of extraterritorial regulation appeared consistent
with, and appeared "logically responsive" to, globalization, the declining power of the sovereign nation-state, and the rise of non-state and
sub-state actors.71
68 Cf YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE
WARS 61-72 (2002) (describing how the human rights movement in the United States
was closely allied with domestic politics); Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Legitimating the
New Legal Orthodoxy, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS 310 (2002) (explaining how "labor
unions and environmental groups in the United States today take their fights for
influence over domestic policy into transnational arenas" because "[s]uccess in the
transnational arena helps particular groups build domestic legitimacy and protect
their domestic power and influence from erosion through transnational decision
making and rule construction").
69 See RAUSTIALA, supra note 11, at 187; see also Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extratenitorialjurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and
InternationalLaw, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 121 (2007) (discussing the implications of extraterritorial criminal law); Charles Doyle, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., Rep. No. 7-5700,
ExtraterritorialApplication ofAmerican CriminalLaw 1 (Mar. 26, 2010) (describing how a
"surprising number of federal criminal statutes have extraterritorial application").
70 For an overview, see Bryant G. Garth, Rebuilding InternationalLaw After the September 11th Attack: ContrastingAgendas of High Priests and Legal Realists, 4 Lov. U. CHI.
INT'L L. REv. 3 (2007); see also Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism
and Revisionism in InternationalLaw, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1404, 1404-14 (2006) (reviewingJACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)).

See generally Parrish, supra note 6, at 822-32 (discussing shifts away from traditional
state-centric positions).
71 See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization ofjurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
311, 329-70 (2002) (arguing that globalization has challenged territorial based rules
for jurisdiction); Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: ExtratenitorialApplication of American
Law, 1991 Sup. CT. REV. 179, 184 (suggesting that "the world in which a presumption
against extraterritoriality made sense is gone"); Saskia Sassen, Territory and Tenitoriality
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As certain groups embraced extraterritoriality for instrumental
reasons in the late 1990s, cases involving legislative jurisdiction also
became the backdrop against which the U.S. Supreme Court would
debate other issues-the role of federal courts in resolving global
challenges, the appropriateness of clear-statement rules, the use of
canons of construction, and whether rules should be preferred over
standards. 72 Often Supreme Court cases addressing legislative jurisdiction served as convenient vehicles for the justices to explore these
other issues, with the significant problems of extraterritoriality not
taking center stage. 73 And as the recent Court redefined itself, legislative jurisdiction cases became a convenient canvas on which the Court
could advance its vision of legislative primacy and its constrained
approach to statutory construction. 74 While law schools continued to
focus on doctrines of personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction,
and forum non conveniens as the bread-and-butter of procedure, it was
cases implicating legislative jurisdiction that regularly appeared on the
U.S. Supreme Court's docket, grabbed national headlines, and
wrought significant changes in law and policy. 75

II. A

DANGEROUS TREND

A new wrinkle has developed that threatens to accelerate the
growth of extraterritorial regulation. Courts have begun to seek ways
to evade legislative jurisdiction analysis entirely. Decisions in the
Ninth and D.C. Circuits exemplify the trend, while the U.S. Supreme
Court's recent opinion in Mornison v. National Australia Bank may
prove to encourage the practice.
A.

Evading Extraterritoriality

Over the last few years, a number of high-profile cases have sidestepped the issue of extraterritoriality. One in the Ninth Circuit and
in the Global Economy, 15 INT'L Soc. 372, 373 (2000) (noting that "we are seeing
processes of incipient denationalization of sovereignty-the partial detachment of
sovereignty from the nation state"). See generally RAUSTIALA, supra note 11, at 228-30,
241-43 (analyzing changes in the territorial system of American law).
72 For a recent discussion, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARv. L. REV. 1214 (2010).
73 Morrison is illustrative, with the justices focusing mostly on debates of legislative
primacy. See Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
74 See Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality:Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against ExtraterritorialApplication of
American Law, 40 Sw. L. REV. 655 (2011).
75 See supra note 7.
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another in the D.C. Circuit are notable in how far they creatively
veered from prior doctrine.
1. Environmental Harm and the Ninth Circuit
First was the Ninth Circuit's landmark decision in Pakootas v. Teck
Cominco Metals, Ltd.7 6 Pakootas involved a privately owned Canadian
corporation that operates a smelting plant in Trail, British Columbia,
Canada, just a few miles north of the American border.7 7 For
decades, the smelter dumped slag-a fine, sand-like byproduct of the
smelting process-into the Columbia River in accordance with Canadian environmental laws and permits.78 In 2003, after preliminary
testing of the upper-Columbia river basin within Washington State,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued a Unilateral Administrative Order demanding that the Canadian corporation conduct a
study consistent with the U.S. Superfund (CERCLA) laws. 79 After the
Canadian corporation refused to comply, in July 2004 a Native American tribe brought a CERCLA citizen's suit against the Canadian corporation in federal court. 0 The suit sought to enforce the EPA's order
and require that the Canadian corporation pay the clean-up costs as a
responsible party under CERCLA.81
The lawsuit was unprecedented.8 2 It represented the first time
that a tribal government had filed a petition for preliminary assessment under CERCLA.8 3 The lawsuit was also the first time the EPA
had taken the extraordinary step of issuing a unilateral order to a
Canadian company doing business solely in Canada. Perhaps most
significantly, it was the first lawsuit brought under CERCLA that
76 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1095 (2008); see also Austen
L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Deyd Vu: Extraterritoriality,InternationalEnvironmental Law, and
the Searchfor Solutions to Canadian-U.S.Transboundary Water PollutionDisputes, 85 B.U. L.
REV. 363 (2005) (discussing the complaint).
77 See Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1068.
78 See id. at 1069; see also Parrish, supra note 76, at 370-72 (describing the extent
of the pollution by the trail smelter in the Columbia River).
79 See Pakootas,452 F.3d at 1070; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, UPPER COLUMBIA RIVER EXPANDED SITE INSPECTION REPORT, NE. WASH. 2-11 (2003) (discussing studies and results regarding slag).
80 See Pakootas,452 F.3d at 1070.
81 See id.
82 For a detailed description of its unprecedented nature, see Parrish, supranote
76, at 367, 379-80, nn.83-85 (citing sources and interviews).
83 See Richard A. Du Bey & Jennifer Sanscrainte, The Role of the Confederated Tribes
of the Colville Reservation in Fighting to Protect and Clean-Up the Boundary Waters of the
United States: A Case Study of the Upper Columbia River and Lake Roosevelt Environment, 12
PENN ST. ENvrt. L. REV. 335, 359 n.161 (2004).
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attempted to apply the Superfund laws to a Canadian company for
conduct occurring entirely outside the United States. 84 The defendant immediately moved to dismiss the case.8 5 The key preliminary
issue was whether CERCLA covered the foreign conduct: could the
EPA force a Canadian company, governed by Canadian environmental law and operating solely in Canada, to comply with the terms of
U.S. domestic environmental regulations?8 6
The reaction was not entirely surprising. The Canadian government bristled at what it perceived to be an impermissible interference
with its own domestic environmental policies.8 7 Canada pointed to a
bilateral treaty-the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty8 8 and its institutions8 9-as the appropriate mechanism for addressing this sort of
transboundary dispute.9 0 The defendant in turn argued that as a
result of the preexisting international agreement covering transboundary water disputes, Congress did not intend CERCLA to
apply to foreign conduct. 9 ' The district court, however, was not persuaded. It found that CERCLA applied extraterritorially because the
effects of the pollution (i.e., the slag discharges) were felt in the
United States. 9 2 It also concluded that the presumption against extra84 See Washington State Tribe Sues Canada Smelter Over Pollution, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS,July 22, 2004 (stating that the case is believed to be "the first case of Americans
suing a Canadian company under U.S. Superfund law").
85 See Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1071.
86 See id.
87 Brief of the Government of Canada, Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
2, Pakootas, 452 F.3d 1066 (No. 06-1188); see also EPA Battles Canadian Company Over
Columbia River, U.S. WATER NEWS ONLINE, Dec. 2003, available at http://www.uswater
news.com/archives/arcquality/3epabatl2.html (noting that "[n]ot since the Pig War
of 1859 between the United States and Great Britain has there been such an international brouhaha in the Pacific Northwest").
88 Treaty Relating to the Boundary Waters, U.S.-Can.,Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448.
89 See generally THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARs ON (Robert
Allan Spencer et al. eds., 1981) (describing Canada's institutions).
90 Brief of the Government of Canada, supra note 87, at 2-4.
91 See Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1073.
92 See Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.
at 14, No. CV-04-256-AAM (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004) (order denying motion to dismiss). The district court explained:
There is no dispute that CERCLA, its provisions and its "sparse" legislative
history, do not clearly mention the liability of individuals and corporations
located in foreign sovereign nations for contamination they cause within the
U.S. At the same time, however, there is no doubt that CERCLA affirmatively expresses a clear intent by Congress to remedy 'domestic conditions'
within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. That clear intent, combined
with the well-established principle that the presumption [against extraterritoriality] is not applied where failure to extend the scope of the statute to a
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territoriality does not apply when effects are felt within the United
States.9 3
The District Court's decision is difficult to square with the objective territoriality principle, but it is consistent with a line of cases
applying a more expansive effects-based approach to jurisdiction. 94 If
simply affirmed, the decision would have been unremarkable. The
Ninth Circuit, however, neatly avoided the key questions altogether
and by doing so broke with even the most far-reaching precedent.
Instead of assessing whether Congress intended CERCLA to apply to
Canadian conduct, or whether the "effects test" reverses the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Ninth Circuit defined away the
problem. Because the clean-up site was in the United States, the court
found the application of CERCLA to be purely domestic.9 5 Inventing
a new and previously unseen approach, the Ninth Circuit found the
place where the remedy was sought to be the key question. It
explained that "[t]he location where a party arranged for disposal or
disposed of hazardous substances is not controlling for purposes of
assessing whether CERCLA is being applied extraterritorially."9 6 The
conclusion was puzzling because liability was based on the conduct of
a Canadian company, operating solely in Canada, in accordance with

foreign setting will result in adverse effects within the United States, leads
this court to conclude that extraterritorial application of CERCLA is appropriate in this case.
Id.
93 Id. at 21.
94 Parrish, supra note 76, at 387-93 (describing effects-based jurisdiction). For
an example of the line of cases adopting an expansive effects-approach, see Envtl.
Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968).
95 Pakootas,452 F.3d at 1078 ("Because the actual or threatened release of hazardous substances triggers CERCLA liability, and because the actual or threatened
release here, the leaching of hazardous substances from slag that settled at the Site,
took place in the United States, this case involves a domestic application of
CERCLA.").
96 Id.; see also id. at 1079 (holding that CERCLA is not applied extraterritorially
"even though the original source of the hazardous substances is located in a foreign
country").
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Canadian law. The decision's reasoning baffled commentators9 7 and
was widely criticized.9 8
The Ninth Circuit, however, has not stood alone in its willingness
to sidestep the difficult questions legislative jurisdiction raises. A second prominent example of a court evading issues of legislative jurisdiction is the D.C. Circuit's 2009 decision in United States v. Philip
Morris.99

Tobacco, Criminal Conspiracies, and the D.C. Circuit

2.

The Philip Morris case involved massive litigation between the
United States and the tobacco industry.1 00 The United States sued
nine cigarette manufacturers and two tobacco-related trade organizations under the civil RICO laws, alleging that the defendants had
joined together in a decades-long scheme to deceive the American
public about the health effects and addictiveness of smoking cigarettes.1 0 One of the defendants, however, was a British company that
was sued for activity and statements made outside the United States. 0 2
97

See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, The Curious Legal Landscape ofExtraterritorialityof
VA. J. INT'L L. 997, 1009 (2010) (noting the ambiguity of
the case for extraterritoriality and that it was decided on convoluted grounds); Stephen R. Smerek & Jason C. Hamilton, 1 ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Law After
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 5 DIsP. RESOL. INT'L 21, 33 (2011) (noting the
"Ninth Circuit sidestepped the extraterritorial question" in Pakootas).
98 A number of student notes have summarized and criticized the decision. See,
e.g., Jennifer S. Addis, Note, A Missed Opportunity: How Pakootas v. Teck Cominco
Metals, Ltd. Could Have Clarified the ExtraterritorialityDoctrine, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1011, 1013, 1026 (2009) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit "disregard[ed] its existing
precedent" and describing "flaws" in a "faulty" analysis); Nathan L. Budde, Note,
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.: Wen Outside the Borders Isn't Extraterritorial,or,
Canada Is in Washington, Right , 15 TUL.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 675, 686-89 (2007) (arguing that the outcome was correct but that the Ninth Circuit "dancied] around,"
"slipped," and "sidestepped" the extraterritoriality issue); Jordan Diamond, Note,
How CERCLA's Ambiguities Muddled the Question of Extraterritorialityin Pakootas v. Teck
Cominco Metals, Ltd., 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1013, 1015, 1035 (2007) (noting that while
the "Ninth Circuit's reasoning was not flawed," "the court's holding skirted the
important issues at stake" and "failed to address ... the logical disconnect between
holding a Canadian company liable for conduct that occurred entirely in Canada in
what it characterized as a domestic application"); Libin Zhang, Comment, Pakootas v.
Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 31 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 545, 545 (2007) (describing the
Ninth Circuit as "evad[ing]" the extraterritoriality question and having "strained legal
fiction" to create an "uncomfortable precedent").
99 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
100 Id. at 1105-06.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1130.
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The case therefore asked, among other things, whether Congress
intended RICO to apply to the foreign conduct of non-nationals. 0 3
The D.C. Circuit failed to tackle the difficult question of RICO's
extraterritorial reach-an issue on which the lower courts were
divided.104 As with the Ninth Circuit's Pakootas decision, the D.C. Circuit treated regulation of foreign conduct as domestic, not extraterritorial, regulation. Without looking at RICO's text, the overall
statutory scheme, the legislative purpose or history, or any other
benchmark for ascertaining congressional intent, the court concluded
that Congress wanted the statute to regulate the foreign conduct of
foreign corporations.1 0 5 It did so by designating a new category of
statutes with "true extraterritorial reach" and found that the presumption against extraterritoriality solely applies in those "true" cases.10 6
The court opined that only statutes that "reach foreign conduct with
no impact on the United States" are extraterritorial.' 0 7 Departing
from and dramatically expanding the objective territoriality principle
without saying so, the D.C. Circuit found that a law is territorial even
when the effects are not "elements of mail and wire fraud offenses or
associated RICO violations."' 0 According to the D.C. Circuit, Congress's regulation of foreign conduct is never extraterritorial, so long
as substantial effects are felt within the United States.' 0 9
The D.C. Circuit's decision was a significant expansion of even
that circuit's prior jurisprudence. At one time, effects could never be
a basis for jurisdiction, except in the very narrow objective territoriality cases. Then, law and practice appeared to soften to permit countries to regulate foreign conduct when substantial effects were felt
within a state's borders. Under this approach, the effects test was used
to determine the outer limits of congressional authority.1 10 Unless a
substantial, foreseeable effect was intended to be felt within the
United States, Congress would not have authority to regulate foreign
conduct and the courts would avoid reading a statute to do so absent
an express statement. Other courts used effects as one factor among
103 Id.
104 Id.; see Brief of the International Association of Defense Counsel, Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, British Am. Tobacco (Invs.) Ltd., v. United States,
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3502 (2010) (No. 09-980).
105 Philip Monis, 566 F.3d at 1129-30.
106 Id. at 1130.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. ("Congress's regulation of foreign conduct meeting this 'effects' test is 'not
an extraterritorialassertion of jurisdiction.'" (citing Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984))).
110 See Parrish, supra note 19, at 1499-1500.
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many in determining legislative intent, while a few outlying decisions
expanded the effects test even more to find that when a substantial
effect is felt within the United States, the presumption against extraterritoriality no longer applies. The D.C. Circuit's decision in Philip
Morris, however, went significantly beyond that. It outstripped prior
precedent to find that once an effect is felt in the United States no
inquiry into congressional intent is necessary at all. It not only
reversed the presumption against extraterritoriality, changing it into a
presumption in favor of extraterritorial regulation, but used the
effects test as a substitute for, and affirmative evidence of, congressional intent."' The Ninth and D.C. Circuit cases might be viewed as
aberrations and outliers-unfortunate perhaps, but limited to their
facts. Yet the U.S. Supreme Court in 2010-in a decision that at least
one scholar has described as "the most important decision construing
the geographic scope of a statute in almost twenty years"' 1 2-seemed
to open the door for the practice to continue.
B.

A New "Focus"

Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.' 13 involved three Australian investors who had bought stock in Australia's largest bank.114
The investors contended that one of the bank's subsidiaries in Florida
had fraudulently miscalculated interest rates on mortgages it was servicing, causing the value of the parent bank's stock to plummet.1 1 5
The investors sued in the United States, pursuing a class-action remedy and claiming that the Florida-based subsidiary had made false and
misleading statements to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission as well as falsified financial data in Florida." 6 The key issue was
whether the anti-fraud provisions of the American securities laws
applied to investment deals that occurred abroad when the securities
deal involved a company whose stock was not traded in the United
States." 7 More specifically, the case asked whether section 10(b) of
the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act "provide [d] a cause of action to
111 Philip Morris, 566 F.3d at 1130.
112 Dodge, supra note 3, at 687; see also Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality,supra
note 74, at 656-57 (arguing that Morrison fundamentally redefined the concept of
extraterritoriality); Theresa L. Davis & James Michael Scheupele, TransnationalFraud
Claims and the ExtraterritorialReach of U.S. Securities Laws: The Beginning of a New Era?
1-2 (2010), available at http://www.loeb.com (follow publications).
113 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
114 Id. at 2875.
115 Id. at 2876.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges." 1 8
The court unanimously concluded that section 10(b) did not provide a cause of action under these circumstances.I 19 The Court did so
by reaffirming the presumption against extraterritoriality and finding
that insufficient evidence existed that Congress intended the Act to
apply to foreign securities. 120 The Court also explained that merely
because some of alleged illegal activity occurred in the United States
did not mean the Act was only being applied domestically. 121 MOTrison's doctrinal breakthrough was how it put an end to so-called "foreign cubed" cases-that is cases brought by foreign claimants against a
foreign company in relation to shares bought on a foreign
exchange.122
In its reasoning, the Court spent considerable ink condemning
the circuit court's creation of the "effects" and "conduct" tests. With
what some have described as sarcasm,1 2 3 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, chastised the Second Circuit for having created "judicialspeculation-made law," without putting "forward a textual or even
extratextual basis" for the effects or conduct tests. 124 The opinion
rejected the argument that domestic effects alone could overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality, colorfully explaining that "the
presumption against extraterritorial application would be a craven
watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic
activity is involved."12 5
The Court could have stopped there. Instead, however, it went
farther to inject a suggestion that the presumption against extraterritoriality only applies to foreign, not domestic, cases. 126 The petitioners asserted that they sought only a domestic application of the Act
118 Id. at 2875.
119 Id. at 2888.
120 Id. at 2883.
121 Id. at 2885.
122 SeeJonathan R. Tuttle et al., Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Reflecting on
Its Impact One Year Later, 1904 PLI/CoRP. 701, 703 (2011) (noting how the case
rejected so-called "F-Cubed" cases).
123 See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Stock FraudLaw: For U.S. Only, ScoTus BLOG (June 24,
2010, 5:43 PM) http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/stock-fraud-law-for-u-s-only/
("With evident sarcasm,Justice Antonin Scalia's opinion for the Court rapped Circuit
Courts for having created, by judicial invention, the authority to decide such lawsuits
when filed by private investors.").
124 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879-81.
125 Id. at 2884.
126 Id.
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because the conduct they sought to punish occurred in Florida.12 7
The Court responded by saying that a court had to assess the "focus"
of the Exchange Act. It concluded that the Act's focus was not "upon
the place where the deception originated, but upon the purchases
and sales of securities in the United States."1 28 A focus analysis is a new
addition to the landscape of legislative jurisdiction analysis.1 29 If a
court determines that the statute's focus is on activity within the
United States, the presumption becomes irrelevant. 13 0 In so doing,
the Court created an unintended loophole that provides courts leeway
to skirt the presumption against extraterritoriality. 1 1
C.

Citiquing the Evasion

The upshot of Morrison's focus discussion, combined with the
Ninth and D.C. Circuit decisions, is not just that it encourages courts
to do an end-run around legislative jurisdiction analysis. Treating the
regulation of foreign activity as "domestic regulation," simply because
an adverse impact is felt in the United States, creates a presumption in
favor of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The impact of eviscerating doctrine this way is at least three-fold.
First, it potentially promises to increase the amount of extraterritorial
regulation through judicial decisions. In a modern, globalized economy, finding some impact on the United States is always possible. 13 2
Second, it upsets the background default rules upon which Congress
legislates. At the very least, it makes those rules less meaningful.
127 Id. at 2883.
128 Id. at 2885. This differed from traditional analysis which assumed that Congress's focus was usually territorial unless Congress indicated otherwise. See United
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-102 (1922) (describing the locus of criminal laws).
129 See Brilmayer, supra note 74, at 661 (noting that the focus analysis "is a relative
newcomer to the jurisprudence of extraterritoriality").
130 See id.
131 See id. at 663-64 ("The possibility that the presumption against extraterritorial
application of a statute can be circumvented simply by declaring the presumption

inapplicable creates a major loophole."). Admittedly, the Court likely did not intend
to create such a loophole. The Court declined, however, to accept review in either
the D.C. Circuit or Ninth Circuit decisions. Its willingness to let those decisions stand,
combined with its discussion of "focus," provides leeway for mischief in the future and
has led some commentators to assert that the Supreme Court supports the D.C. and
Ninth Circuit's novel approaches. See Clopton, supra note 3; Dodge, supra note 3.
132 See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 6, at 573 (questioning whether in today's
global economy basing jurisdiction on effects permits almost limitless legislative jurisdiction); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 1155, 1182
(2007) ("[I1n an electronically connected world the effects of any given action may
immediately be felt elsewhere with no relationship to physical geography at all.").
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When a court will apply the presumption against extraterritoriality
and when it will choose to ignore it becomes less clear. Third, it
encourages more ad hoc decisions and reduces predictability as courts
have little guidance as to which rules to follow (at least outside the
securities context). In cases where a court is opposed to finding the
law applies, the court can invoke a rigorous presumption against
extraterritoriality. In cases where a court wishes to provide a remedy,
the court can simply define away the problem. Legislative jurisdiction
thus becomes overly malleable: providing judges cover to make what
otherwise would be tendentious or merits-driven decisions (or, at
least, decisions based on other, unwritten considerations) .133 In turn,
the presumption against extraterritoriality is rendered too feeble to
protect against exorbitant jurisdictional assertions.
Even if a more charitable assessment is made, encouraging courts
to sidestep the jurisdictional analysis or engage in a "focus" analysis
contributes little but obfuscation to the legislative jurisdiction analysis.
It takes a relatively straightforward inquiry into congressional intent
and replaces it with a free-wheeling assessment of the legislation's
gravitational center. Another problem exists. What courts should
consider in determining the "focus" of legislation is uncertain. Presently, the test is so unformed that lower courts have almost no guidance on how to proceed in a principled way. A focused analysis thus
may give new life to a broadly-conceived effects test 134-an approach
that the Supreme Court appeared to wish to enter with Morrison.
III.

A

RETURN TO

FIRST

PRINCIPLES

As stated in the Introduction, this Essay's purpose is not to provide an extensive framework or rubric for deciding legislative jurisdiction cases. Its primary aim is descriptive: to reveal a recent
development that, if not checked, may augur a sea change in how
courts address legislative jurisdictional issues. The Essay ends, however, by suggesting that courts would do well to return to the wellestablished tenets of legislative jurisdiction and international law.
133 See Robert A. Leflar, Honest judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 721, 735-41
(1979) (arguing for intellectual honesty and the need for judges to accurately articulate the reasons for their decisions); David L. Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicial Candor, 100
HARv. L. REv. 731, 737-50 (1987) (arguing that honesty and candor are essential
attributes to the judicial process); see also Knox, supra note 4, at 388 ("Courts should
strive to employ interpretative canons that are transparent and coherent enough for
Congress, the executive and everyone else concerned to be able to predict whether
and how they will be used to construe legislation.").
134 See Dodge, supra note 3 (arguing that Morrisonembraced an effects test despite
language in the opinion to the contrary).
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Courts should be skeptical of a litigant's claims that Congress intends
a law to apply to the foreign conduct of non-citizens.
A.

A Revived Presumption, the End to Effects

In the wake of Morrison, lower courts will be tempted to follow
one of two paths-either to take to heart the Court's condemnation
of the effects test, or instead circumvent it through a focus analysis
that finds extraterritoriality not in play if domestic effects are shown.
With luck, courts won't be lulled to the wrong path and will more
closely hew to the presumption against extraterritorial regulation
when dealing with foreign defendants acting abroad.1 35 The presumption that Congress only employs its territorial jurisdiction absent
a congressional directive is not an arbitrary or hollow canon-it
encapsulates important considerations.
Enshrined in the presumption is the recognition that extraterritorial laws regulating foreigners are problematic and should be used
with great care. As an initial matter, extraterritorial laws that impose
obligations on non-citizens are inherently undemocratic because they
impose obligations on individuals and groups who have no formal
voice in the political process and who have not consented to those
laws. 136 Because of this political-legitimacy deficit, laws that regulate
foreign conduct are often perceived to be antithetical to basic notions
of fairness and self-governance.13 7 Not surprisingly, extraterritorial
135 Adhering to the presumption should present no doctrinal difficulty for courts:
the Supreme Court has repeatedly told the courts to follow it. See id. In Morrison, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the continuing vitality of the presumption. Morrison v.
Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877-78 (2010).
136 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("That to secure
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from
the consent of the governed."); THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) (emphasizing that the Constitution's authority would derive from popular consent); THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (James Madison) (arguing that greater exercises of power require more
frequent voter participation); cf John Locke, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 362
(Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (suggesting that government authority can legitimately
derive only from the consent of the governed). The Supreme Court's jurisprudence
often underscores the importance of the right to a voice in legislative processes. See
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) ("No right is more precious ... than that
of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws. . . . Other rights, even
the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined."). For an argument that
the right to democratic representation is becoming an international norm, see
Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46
(1992).
137 See generally Mark P. Gibney, The ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Law: The Perversion of Democratic Governance, the Reversal of InstitutionalRoles, and the Imperative of
EstablishingNormative Principles, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 312-13 (describing
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regulation is barred domestically: the extraterritoriality principle formally prohibits American states from regulating conduct of non-citizens occurring in sister states.13 Indeed, it is particularly odd that
under current jurisprudence American states when joining a federal
system purportedly retained greater sovereignty to be free from extraterritorial regulation than foreign countries.13 9 While debate exists as
to how much sovereignty states retain under the Constitution, no one
argues that states secured greater sovereignty by joining the Union.
the unfairness and undemocratic nature of extraterritorial laws regulating foreigners). Extraterritorial laws are in tension with the universal right under international
law to self-government. See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights art. 23, Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg.
at 75, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217A, at 75, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10,
1948). Similarly, extraterritorial laws are in tension with the right to self-determination. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (noting the UN's basic respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples); cf Russell A. Miller, Self-Determination in InternationalLaw and the Demise of Democracy?, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 601
(2003) (examining democratic deficiencies that have plagued invocation of the international legal principle of self-determination).
138 The extraterritoriality principle holds that a state may "may not 'project its
legislation into [other States]."' Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor
Auth.,.476 U.S. 573, 582-83 (1986) (alteration in original) (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935)); see also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324,
336-37 (1989) (explaining that states may not regulate "commerce that takes place
wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within
the State .. . [if its] practical effect is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the
State," or if it risks creating a problem with "inconsistent legislation arising from the
projection of one state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State."
(quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982))); Bonaparte v. Tax
Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881) (stating that a state may not legislate "except with
reference to its own jurisdiction"). For scholarship describing the extraterritoriality
principle in the domestic context, see Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1520-21 (2007) (describing the general prohibition against extraterritorial regulation, but noting that it is formal in nature and not
absolute); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) ExtraterritorialState Legislation, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1884-1913 (1987) (describing the extraterritoriality principle).
Cf Mark D. Rosen, State ExtraterritorialPowers Reconsidered, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1133, 1135 (2010) (noting a strand of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence that
prohibits domestic extraterritorial regulation, but concluding that political processes,
not the Constitution, imposes limits on when a state within the United States may
regulate conduct occurring in another state).
139 See Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the
ExtraterritorialityPrinciple in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1057,
1128-29 (2009) (advocating for "within-jurisdiction effects as a basis for regulation"
drawn from international cases, while noting that this is not the current law in domestic legislative jurisdiction).
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Second, the presumption serves a separation-of-powers function
and helps allocate authority. Underlying the presumption is the
understanding that Congress, rather than the courts, is better
equipped to make the policy and judgment calls as to whether law
should apply to foreign conduct. 140 The presumption thus requires
that Congress must have actually given the issue of a statute's geographic reach thought: congressional silence is insufficient. It also
conveys an allocation-of-authority concept in a different way. The presumption reflects the pragmatic reality that international law, rather
than domestic law, is often best suited to address international challenges. 141 Simply put, global challenges usually require comprehensive, harmonized responses, with cooperation and agreement among
many states. Unilaterally imposed extraterritorial measures often
undermine and hamper those multilateral efforts.
Third, a robust territorial presumption reduces friction with foreign nations, who bristle at what they perceive to be illegitimate assertions of power, if not legal imperialism. 14 2 Indeed, other countries
view jurisdiction based solely on effects with inherent suspicion, if not
as outright violative of international law.' 4 3 The result is that foreign
countries often attempt to weaken the impact of extraterritorial regulation through diplomatic protests, nonrecognition ofjudgments, and
blocking or clawback statutes. 144 In addition, on the margins, the presumption avoids difficult constitutional and international law issues
that can arise with extraterritorial regulation of non-citizens. 145
140 See Bradley, supra note 43, at 524-29 (arguing that a central purpose of the
Charming Betsy canon is to avoid having judges, who are politically unaccountable and
inexpert in foreign affairs, erroneously place the United States in violation of international law through their construction of a statute); Knox, supranote 4, at 386 ("Courts
have no expertise in foreign relations, and whenever possible they should take care
not to create political headaches for those with responsibility in this area."). A similar
argument is made in the domestic context. See supra text accompanying note 138.
141 The concept of a natural forum is familiar in the federal-state context.
142 See Gary B. Born, Reflections on judicialJurisdictionin InternationalCases, 17 GA.J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 28-29 (1987) (describing how an exorbitant jurisdictional assertion "can readily arouse foreign resentment," "provoke diplomatic protests, trigger
commercial or judicial retaliation, and threaten friendly relations in unrelated
fields").
143 See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 6, at 569, 573, 648-50 (explaining how "postWar assertions of U.S. legislative jurisdiction often aroused diplomatic protests and
legal objections from foreign states"); John B. Sandage, Forum Non Conveniens and the
ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J. 1693, 1698 (1985)
(explaining that the effects test was perceived as "Yankee 'jurisdictional jingoism'
[that] created wide-spread resentment").
144 See Parrish, supra note 19, at 1491-92 nn.190-93.
145 See supra notes 136-39, 142-43.
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To avoid misunderstanding, emphasizing the limits of this Essay's
critique is also necessary. Adhering to principles of territoriality on
the international arena is not to solve the current debate among the
justices as to what is required to show a "clear indication of intent,"
and to what extent legislative history or other indicia of intent can be
accounted for. Believing that countries should avoid using domestic
law to regulate the foreign activity of non-citizens is not to necessarily
require a strict clear statement rule.14 6 But it does mean that domestic effects alone are never a basis for assuming that Congress intended
to regulate foreign activity. And it requires that whenever a litigant
seeks damages based on foreign activity that a court must ascertain
whether Congress intended to regulate that foreign conduct. In this
way, the effects test should be constrained, or at least not further
expanded. At the very least, it suggests that the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit and D.C. Circuit decisions was wrong.
Another misunderstanding is also common. It is tempting to
engage in the conceit that extraterritorial laws are necessary, or at
least that courts should rescue Congress from its oversight if it failed
to contemplate the issue of geographic scope when it enacted a law.
The worry over regulatory-free zones where foreign companies appear
liberated from U.S. laws motivates the concern. But while seductive,
the concern has always been misleading. First, under the nationality
principle, a state has jurisdiction to regulate the conduct of citizens
abroad.14 7 So while it is true that citizens and U.S. corporations
should not be able to escape national regulatory objectives by simply
moving certain activities offshore, that truism does not support basing
jurisdiction on the effects of foreign conduct. The problems with
extraterritoriality do not apply, or are significantly reduced, in situations where the United States holds its own citizens, and its own government, to domestic standards abroad. Second, suggesting that
courts should gingerly assume that Congress exercised extraterritorial
power is not to argue for no regulation. The opposite is true. In a
modern, global economy, transnational activities usually require some
level of regulation, if not comprehensive regulation. But there is no
reason to assume that the regulation must be, or is appropriately, unilateral and domestic in nature. Instead it is to recognize that interna146 Clear statement rules have their drawbacks. See David L. Shapiro, Continuity
and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 921, 959 (1992) (noting the
"extraordinary burdens" that clear statement rules impose on the legislative process).
147 See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824) ("The law of no nation can
justly extend beyond its own territory, except so far as regards to its own citizens." (emphasis added)); see also HarvardResearch, supra note 23, at 445 (describing the nationality
principle).
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tional law, and the consent-based multilateralism upon which it is
based, is better suited to address international disputes.

B.

The World in Our Courts, Americans in Foreign Courts

Although the foregoing suggests there are theoretical, doctrinal,
and other drawbacks to courts evading legislative jurisdiction analysis,
a long-term pragmatic concern is also at stake. The readiness of
courts to apply U.S. law to the foreign conduct of non-citizens says
much about what form of global governance the U.S. wishes to promote. Will international challenges in the coming decades be
resolved comprehensively or in a hodge-podge, piece-meal fashion?
Will the world be one governed by multilateral agreement or instead
by a free-for-all, where each state is free to impose its own vision and
where exceptionalism rather than the rule of law controls?
While the "unilateral-free-for-all" vision has its adherents, how far
that vision departs from common understandings of international law
is worth underscoring. The international system was structured in a
way to encourage cooperation, reduce conflict, and promote democratic self-government. 14 8 Those ideals are undermined if our
149
national courts sidestep international law to unilaterally regulate.
As one circuit court explained the problems with this form of legal
imperialism:
The United States should not impose its own view of [legal standard
on a foreign country] .

.

. with a vastly different standard of living,

wealth, resources, level of health care and services, values, morals
and beliefs than [its] own.

. .

. Faced with different need, problems

and resources [the foreign country] may, in balancing the pros and
cons of a [product's] use, give different weight to various factors
that would our society.

. .

. Should we impose our standard upon

them in spite of such differences? We think not. 50
148 See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2.
149 For a discussion of how extraterritorial laws raise concerns, including concerns
of democratic legitimacy, see Parrish, supra note 19, at 1455, 1482-89; see also Gibney, supra note 137, at 312-13 (describing the undemocratic nature of extraterritorial
laws); cf. Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989)
(setting out a political rights or political theory approach to conflict of laws); Diane F.
Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling UniversalJurisdictionwith Democratic Principles,92
GEO. L.J. 1059, 1065 (2004) ("[T]he task today is to identify democratic principles
appropriate to transnational lawmaking phenomena.").
150 Harrison v. Wyeth Labs. Div. of Am. Home Prods. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 1, 4-5
(E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982); see also William L. Reynolds, The
ProperForumfor Suit: TransnationalForumNon Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions in
the Federal Courts, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1663, 1708-09 (1992) (noting that "[a]ll law repre-
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Although we may "cherish the image of our courts as the refuge of all
seeking succor,"1 5 ' as one commentator provocatively explains, "it is
past time for us to get it through our heads that it is not everyone but
us who is out of step." 15 2
Yet whether we want foreigners to litigate their claims in our
courts is perhaps the wrong question to ask. What's in play is less
about entertaining foreign cases in U.S. courts, and more about
whether we are prepared to have foreign courts adjudicate the propriety of American conduct occurring in the United States. This reciprocity point bears particular emphasis, although it is absent from
many discussions of extraterritoriality. After years of the U.S. being
one of the few to apply its laws extraterritorially, other countries have
begun to follow suit.' 5 3 The impact has grown as American-style litigation has migrated to other countries.154 While the idea of a U.S.
global policeman may be troubling, equally or perhaps more troubling is the idea that every nation's regulatory system has global reach.
U.S. courts should be wary of fostering a system that inherently undermines sovereignty and encourages surrendering control to foreign
courts. Those courts are less likely to reach decisions that promote
American interests. Hewing to a presumption against extraterritorial
jurisdictional assertions thus prevents the further development of a
norm that provides other states with authority to attempt to regulate
and prescribe American activity within the United States whenever
some foreign effect can be alleged. 5 5
A final point to end with. This Essay does not suggest that extraterritorial regulation is always a bad idea. That would be a particularly
sents a compromise among many policy objectives," and that "[w]e should at least
hesitate before imposing 'our' solutions on 'their' problems").
151 Reynolds, supra note 150, at 1710 (arguing that "judicial chauvinism" should
be replaced by "judicial comity").
152 Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for Resolving Conflict-of-Law Problems in Mass Tort
Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 129, 155 (1989).
153 For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Austen L. Parrish,
Reclaiming InternationalLaw from Extraterritoriality,93 MINN. L. REv. 815 (2009).
154 Some have described the U.S.'s three largest exports as "'rock music, blue
jeans, and United States law.'" United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 281
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism:
The ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Law, 14 INT'L LAW. 257, 257 (1980)). For
a recent discussion, see Mark A. Behrens et al., Global Litigation Trends, 17 MICH. ST.
U. COLL. L.J. INT'L L. 165 (2008-09).
155 This issue has arisen prominently in the recent debates over EU privacy laws
that purport to apply worldwide. See Francine Hardaway, New EU Data Privacy Laws
Affect All of Us, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 3, 2012, 3:37 PM), http://www.businessinsider.
com/new-eu-data-privacy-laws-affect-all-of-us-2012-1.
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strong position, and not the position advocated here. In under-regulated areas, extraterritorial regulation can fill a gap. And it may be
that extraterritorial regulation can serve as a placeholder before more
comprehensive, international agreement can be reached. Sometimes
the United States is not able to wait until multilateral negotiation concludes before taking action. At minimum, increased extraterritorial
regulation provides more fora where injured plaintiffs can seek a remedy. Indeed, these policy considerations all make extraterritoriality
expedient and alluring. For these reasons, it may be that in narrow
circumstances Congress will decide the short-term benefits to extraterritorially regulating non-nationals outweigh its long-term costs. But
that decision should not to be taken lightly, and one the courts should
not simply assume. At least courts should address these considerations head on and not evade the important issues that legislative jurisdiction implicates.
CONCLUSION

In a number of recent, high-profile decisions, circuit courts have
evaded legislative jurisdiction analysis by employing the fiction that
not all laws that regulate the overseas conduct of foreigners should be
considered extraterritorial. The U.S. Supreme Court last term may
have unintentionally encouraged this doctrinally odd approach by
finding that legislation focused domestically is not extraterritorial,
even if foreign conduct is regulated. This Essay has explained why the
circuit court decisions and that particular reading of Morrison are not
defensible doctrinally. It also underscores why these approaches significantly break from previously accepted practice.
But the Essay has attempted to go beyond those descriptive
points: more is in play than simply a doctrinal battle. The willingness
of courts to find that a law regulates the foreign conduct of nonnationals-even absent any indication that Congress considered the
issue-reflects a very different vision of the world than we are traditionally accustomed. Evading legislative jurisdiction analysis and promoting extraterritorial domestic law is to take an approach that
privileges and fosters unilateralism while undermining traditional
international law-making and the multilateralism upon which it is
based. The new approach is troubling. With luck, it will be short
lived.
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